

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES—Monday, January 7, 1991

The House met at 12 noon.

The Chaplain, Rev. James David Ford, D.D., offered the following prayer:

We pray, gracious God, for the leaders of our Nation and all representatives of the peoples of our world, that wisdom and discernment will mark their actions and that justice will be their goal. May every person, O God, be mindful that all people are created by Your love and grace and that each of us should live our lives in respect of our brothers and sisters and so honor Your love to the whole created world. In Your name, we pray. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

The SPEAKER. The Chair has examined the Journal of the last day's proceedings and announces to the House his approval thereof.

Pursuant to clause 1, rule I, the Journal stands approved.

PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE

The SPEAKER. The Chair will recognize the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. SKAGGS] to lead us in the Pledge of Allegiance.

Mr. SKAGGS led the Pledge of Allegiance as follows:

I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.

SWEARING IN OF THE HONORABLE BOB CARR, OF MICHIGAN, AND THE HONORABLE PAUL E. GILLMOR, OF OHIO, AS MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE

The SPEAKER. Will the following Members-elect come forward and take the oath of office: the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. CARR] and the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. GILLMOR].

Mr. CARR and Mr. GILLMOR appeared at the bar of the House and took the oath of office, as follows:

Do you solemnly swear that you will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that you will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that you take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion, and that you will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which you are about to enter. So help you God.

The SPEAKER. Congratulations. You are now Members of the Congress of the United States.

COMMUNICATION FROM THE CLERK OF THE HOUSE

The SPEAKER laid before the House the following communication from the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

WASHINGTON, DC,
January 7, 1991.

Hon. THOMAS S. FOLEY,
The Speaker, House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: Pursuant to the permission granted in Clause 5 of Rule III of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives, I have the honor to transmit a sealed envelope received from the White House at 11:48 a.m. on Friday, January 4, 1991 and said to contain a message from the President whereby he transmits an Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada on Fisheries Enforcement.

With great respect, I am,

Sincerely yours,

DONALD K. ANDERSON,
Clerk, House of Representatives.

FISHERIES AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (H. DOC. NO. 102-22)

The SPEAKER laid before the House the following message from the President of the United States; which was read and, together with the accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries and ordered to be printed.

(For message, see proceedings of the Senate of Friday, January 4, 1991, at page S71.)

□ 1210

CONGRESS HAS RESPONSIBILITY TO EXERCISE RIGHT TO AUTHORIZE WAR

(Mr. SKAGGS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Speaker, history shows that civilizations, and Western democracies in particular, have evolved as the powers of kings and executives have been constrained by law, that is, by a distinction between what one has the power to do, and what one has the right to do.

In the United States, our Constitution reflects particularly the lessons of England, where, over time, the powers of the King were curtailed and replaced by the rights of the people as exercised by their representatives in Parliament.

In this sense, it is apparent that President Bush now has the power, if

he chooses, to go to war against Iraq, without waiting for Congress to authorize war. But having the power to do it does not give him the right to do it, a right which under the Constitution he does not have.

As he seeks to restore the rule of law in the Persian Gulf, the President must not trample our own Constitution and rule of law.

Just as the Congress has the right to determine whether to authorize war or not, it also has, under the present circumstances, the responsibility to exercise that right. Let us then proceed with debate and with a vote.

INTRODUCTION OF LEGISLATION TO PROHIBIT FOREIGN OWNERSHIP OF PARK SERVICE CONCESSIONS

(Mr. CONTE asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. CONTE. Mr. Speaker, in the effort by foreign interests to buy up America, one piece of America itself has gone on the auction block. The Japanese have acquired a company that owns the lucrative concession at Yosemite National Park. That means all services and facilities will be controlled by foreign interests, and the profits from this uniquely American monument will flow overseas to Japan. The "Buy-Up of America," Mr. Speaker has gone too far.

The national parks of this country are known throughout the world for their natural beauty, their historical significance, and their cultural diversity.

Yellowstone, Yosemite, and the Grand Canyon are examples of natural wonders unique to the United States.

The historical importance to the Nation of Gettysburg, Independence Hall, and Faneuil Hall in Boston is without question.

And the cultural traditions preserved at Mesa Verde in Colorado, Lowell National Park in Massachusetts, and the Aztec Ruins in New Mexico are important to our national heritage.

These places, the diverse areas that comprise the National Park System, are uniquely American treasures—representing the foundations upon which this Nation was built. We must entrust their care and development to Americans who have American and not foreign interests and pure profits in mind.

That is why I introduced H.R. 294, a bill to prohibit foreign ownership of Park Service concessions. The bill is not antiforeign. It is pro-American.

□ This symbol represents the time of day during the House proceedings, e.g., □ 1407 is 2:07 p.m.

Matter set in this typeface indicates words inserted or appended, rather than spoken, by a Member of the House on the floor.

And it is not protectionism but patriotism. Join me in putting the brakes on the "Buy-up of America." Cosponsor H.R. 294.

LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM

(Mr. MICHEL asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, I ask for this time for the purpose of inquiring of the distinguished Speaker how he sees the program unfolding for the balance of this week.

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Speaker, will the distinguished Republican leader yield?

Mr. MICHEL. I am happy to yield to the distinguished gentleman from Washington.

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Speaker, in consultation with Members of the Democratic leadership as well as with the distinguished Republican leader, it is my view that we should resume session of the Congress on Thursday as well as on Wednesday and Friday of this week, and that we should prepare for action on Thursday by the Committee on Rules to make available for consideration of the House on Friday and perhaps on Saturday as well resolutions relating to the Persian Gulf.

This is a difficult and critical time in our country's history and in the international affairs of the Nation. We obviously have an enormous force of young Americans, men and women, standing guard in the gulf, and perhaps being called upon to engage in military actions, depending on whether there is a compliance with the U.N. resolutions.

I think there is a feeling in this House that the House and the Congress should speak on these questions, that they have a constitutional as well as moral responsibility to do so, and because of the fast-approaching deadline of the U.N. resolution which is midnight on Monday night, I feel that it is incumbent on the leadership to notify Members that we should be undertaking debate and decision on these matters this week.

Accordingly, in a moment, I am going to ask unanimous consent that when the House adjourns on Wednesday it adjourn to meet at noon on Thursday, but for the benefit of Members, assuming this unanimous consent is granted, I would suggest that the session on Friday will not be pro forma but will undoubtedly, in my view, schedule action of the most important kind for votes and resolution by the House, and that perhaps Saturday as well. I am not sure that that will be required, but I think Members should accommodate their schedules to a session of the House on Saturday as well as Friday.

We will not ask unanimous consent at this time for a Saturday session, but it would be automatic if we did not go over until Monday, in any event, but

the announcement of a Saturday session I will postpone, but to give some advance warning to Members that it might take place.

The exact character of these resolutions, I think, has to be determined by the Committee on Rules, and I would hope that it would do so in a way which would give the broadest consensus of the Members to the issues, to the issues that are going to be presented to the House. I know there will be disagreement on the individual positions taken by Members, but I hope that the Committee on Rules can accommodate a broad opinion of the House as to those matters which it will be asked to decide, and I would anticipate, again, that the Committee on Rules action will probably occur on Thursday.

It will be, I think, the intention of the chairman of the Democratic caucus to call a meeting of the Democratic caucus for 10 o'clock, I believe, on Thursday, and I am sure that the Republican leadership will make whatever announcements are appropriate on their side. But this is an announcement I thought should be made today at the earliest time and in the most public way possible.

Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, I gather from the scenario that the gentleman has laid out for us here, even stretching conceivably into Saturday session, that he would structure or at least the Committee on Rules would permit sufficient time for debate, but to come to some conclusion before the weekend is out.

I had occasion, since our earlier conversation this morning, to talk to several Members on the other side of the Capitol to try to get some kind of sense of feel about their debate and how long it might run and would they come to a resolution.

□ 1220

It was a feeling of at least one of the Members with whom I talked that the talks might very well go on beyond the weekend into next week, and that there would not be a firm resolution on the part of whatever is before the other body before that magic date of midnight on the 14th or 15th, depending upon what day we are talking about.

I would like to say for my own part, I certainly do not want to shirk any responsibility and role that I have to play here. My point, I guess, and no surprise, would be in full support of what the President has done up to this point, and frankly, probably what he has in mind for the future. Each Member is elected by our own constituencies here, 435 on this side of the Capitol and 100 on the other side, and I suspect we can get 535 different views on exactly what we ought to be doing; specifically, strategywise, timewise, and all the rest. It bothers me somewhat when, in the field of foreign affairs, and particularly, trying to influence one

individual, we may be giving a kind of message that speaks with all kinds of voices all over the lot which frankly does not exactly help the President in his very difficult position of focusing in, specifically, on one individual, to convince him of what is at stake on that debate prescribed by the United Nations resolution.

However, I think if the distinguished Speaker would respond to that earlier question I would appreciate it.

Mr. FOLEY. I think it is a matter of such importance that we would not want to unduly constrain debate, but I agree with the suggestion that I think it is a debate that should be concluded, if possible, this week.

Mr. MICHEL. Then, of course, I would assume that because, sensing the mood temper of some Members with whom we have talked, and the Speaker obviously, on both sides of the aisle, we in our side of the aisle would get at least a good sound hearing before the Committee on Rules, in those deliberations, that will determine how and in what form we will debate that issue here later on this week?

Mr. FOLEY. I will repeat what I said just a moment ago, that I believe this is a matter of such grave importance that to the extent possible, the Committee on Rules should try to accommodate the broadest segment of the House, regardless, obviously, of party, on the issues to be addressed. There will not be unanimity, of course, on these issues. They are grave and serious enough to obviously include serious division and disagreement, but to the extent possible, we would like to have satisfaction that those issues that are presented are issues that reasonably address the options that the Congress should consider.

Mr. MITCHEL. I thank the distinguished Speaker.

ADJOURNMENT FROM WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 9, 1991, TO THURSDAY, JANUARY 10, 1991

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that when the House adjourns on Wednesday, January 9, 1991, it adjourn to meet at noon on Thursday, January 10, 1991.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. MONTGOMERY). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Washington?

There was no objection.

CONDOLENCES TO CONGRESSMAN NATCHER

(Mr. MAZZOLI asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MAZZOLI. Mr. Speaker, I had planned today to make a 1-minute address on the subject of campaign finance reform. It happens that today's

Washington Post has an interesting lead editorial, underscoring the need that this Congress has to get to the reform of our election laws.

However, two events intervened, which I would like to address this morning.

One is the tragic death of the wife of the dean of our Kentucky delegation Congressman WILLIAM NATCHER's beloved wife, Virginia, passed away yesterday morning. I am sure that all Members join in extending to Chairman NATCHER, our dear friend, our condolences and our sympathies to him and to his family.

The other item I would address momentarily, Mr. Speaker, is what Speaker FOLEY said a moment ago. I salute him for his decision that the House will take up the whole question of its responsibilities, under the Constitution, with respect to the crisis in the gulf. It is a very important issue. I am glad that this House will tackle the subject, as vexing and as difficult as it is, because, for my part, I believe that no offensive action should be taken without prior authority of this House, short of some activity on the part of Iraq, against our people or against our forces.

I am very happy to say that we are going to be here in session, and that we will take up this very important issue.

A TRIBUTE TO MRS. WILLIAM H. NATCHER

(Mr. HUBBARD asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HUBBARD. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the comments by my friend and colleague from Kentucky, Congressman RON MAZZOLI, regarding the death of Mrs. Virginia Natcher yesterday here in Washington.

Virginia Natcher, wife of our distinguished friend and colleague from Kentucky, Congressman WILLIAM H. NATCHER, died yesterday at age 78.

BILL and Virginia NATCHER had been married for 53 years. "We grew up together," Congressman NATCHER said of his wife and helpmate yesterday.

Congressman NATCHER is the dean of our Kentucky delegation and was first elected to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1953. He and his wife were married June 17, 1937. The Natchers have maintained homes in Bowling Green, KY, and Washington, DC.

Mrs. Natcher was the former Virginia Reardon. Her father, Dr. F.D. Reardon, was a physician in Bowling Green. Like her husband, Virginia Natcher was born and raised in Bowling Green, KY. She had a masters degree from Vanderbilt University in Nashville, TN, and once taught history at what is now Western Kentucky University.

Survivors include two daughters, Celeste Jirles of Cambridge, OH, and Lou-

ise Murphy of Los Angeles, six grandsons and a granddaughter.

My wife Carol and I extend to Congressman NATCHER and his family our sympathy.

A SALUTE TO DEBATE

(Mrs. SCHROEDER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Speaker, we have known for a long time of the potential of taking Desert Shield, a passive defensive operation, and molding it into Desert Sword, as of January 15. The great horror was that could happen without this great body of elected officials representing the American people having a debate. I am very pleased today that the leadership has said we will have a debate. I think that is absolutely going to the core of our Constitution and what this great Nation stands for.

Yes, this is a democracy. They cannot do that in Iraq, but we can do that here. I think, for the American people, this a great victory. Therefore, I hope, within the next few days, they will be contacting their elected officials, because there really will be a chance to have input and some kind of say as to whether or not this Nation commits itself to war in the next few days. That will be the most important decision this Congress will make.

It may be our first, but it may be our most important. Therefore, I hope people really stay focused on it.

THE NATCHER TEAM

(Mr. BENNETT asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Speaker, I want to express on behalf of every Member in Congress, and I think the country as a whole, our sorrow in the passing of Mrs. Natcher, and our congratulations to the great team of BILL NATCHER and his wife, and the fine things they have achieved for this country as a team which, in fact, they have done.

I do not think in the history of Congress there has ever been a more beloved Member of Congress than BILL NATCHER, because of the excellence of his service, because of his great spirit, and because of his vision of things good for our country. I think that has to be shared by his late wife, who is now departed.

The second thing I would like to say is that I want to congratulate the Speaker for his leadership in seeing to it that we in the House of Representatives are going to have an opportunity to vote on what well ought to be done with regard to Desert Shield. I am very grateful for this opportunity, and I

congratulate him for bringing this to a head.

□ 1230

A MOST IMPORTANT DEBATE

(Mr. MARKEY asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise to congratulate the Speaker of the House for scheduling the debate on the question of American military involvement offensively in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, Kuwait, and Iraq. There is no more important power which is granted to the Congress than the decision as to whether or not American young men should fight and die on foreign soil, and this debate is one which I believe will be the most important one that has been conducted in my 15 years in the U.S. Congress.

The question before us is one which is quite simple, in fact. It is the issue of whether or not there is an alternative to having American young men die in the sands of Kuwait and Iraq. That is whether or not we can put an international military force around Kuwait and Iraq on permanent basis, as we did with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw bloc countries and whether or not we can put an economic embargo around that country permanently, putting a stranglehold upon 40 percent of its economy, the oil exports and a technological stranglehold around it in terms of resupply or parts for its Mig's and its tanks and then watching slowly, but surely, Saddam and his regime collapse.

I believe it is an important debate because it asks the question whether or not we can work smarter, not harder, whether boys, young men, will have to die or whether we will have the patience for internationally, our strategy of economic embargo and military technological, stranglehold to work, to eventually but inexorably bring Saddam to his knees.

FOREIGN MANAGEMENT OF CONCESSIONS IN OUR NATIONAL PARKS

(Mr. PEASE asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. PEASE. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to comment briefly on the resolution introduced by our colleague, the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. CONTE], which seeks to make sure that no foreign company can own or manage a concession in any of our national parks.

I noted with interest and with gratitude the fact that our colleagues did not bash the Japanese in his presentation.

I think for the record we ought to be aware of the fact that Matsushita did not set out to buy the company that has the concession in Yosemite Park. What it bought was a huge conglomerate which happened to own that company.

Further, Matsushita has indicated an interest in selling that company because it recognizes the political sensitivity of a foreign firm operating a concession in Yosemite.

So while we can express concern, as the gentleman has, let us be very careful that we not unduly take this opportunity, as some people unfortunately have, to bash the Japanese and thereby to worsen a trading relationship which is one of the most important in the world.

THE PERSIAN GULF CRISIS

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. McCloskey). Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. ALEXANDER] is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. ALEXANDER. Mr. Speaker, the drama in the desert sands of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf region is dramatic evidence that America has lost control of its energy supply, the very lifeblood of our economy. This loss of control became because of our ever-increasing addiction to foreign oil, an addiction which threatens our very freedom in the United States.

An avid description of the dilemma we face is contained in a book that was recently published, entitled "Saddam Hussein and the Crisis in the Persian Gulf."

I quote from that book:

Oil is the modern world's heroin. The pleasure it provides fuels a way of life no other energy source can satisfy so plentifully and so cheaply. Efforts to kick the habit have proven half-hearted, painful, and unsuccessful. Today the trade in petroleum, like the traffic in drugs, is so mixed in the veins of nations that most countries, whether rich or poor, find their economies held hostage to this remarkable substance.

It is sad to say, but America is a nation of foreign oil junkies, addicted to imported crude and subject to the tyranny of economic and political manipulation. Economies, politics, and oil have been forged into a seemingly unbreakable chain since the 1970's when the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Companies, OPEC, began to truly flex its muscles and designed the fate of the world as we view it today. That chain now shackles America. The addict is not only a dependent, but a slave.

The path to addiction was predictable. We were hooked one fix at a time. Our dealers manipulated us by promising a steady supply at a cheap price. Once we were hooked, however, it did not much matter what the price was or what we had to do to protect that supply.

Thousands of young Americans, 300,000 Americans, are now encamped on the sands of Saudi Arabia because of the addiction of our Nation to foreign oil, because of our lack of political resolve in breaking that addiction.

I am aware that many reasons have been given for Operation Desert Shield. Stay tuned and you will hear them all recited dramatically, eloquently, and effectively here on the floor of this House this week as we begin the debate on whether or not to declare war in the Middle East.

□ 1240

But we must never forget that one dominant purpose overshadows all others, and that is the need for foreign oil.

No less an authority than Texas oilman T. Boone Pickens, a big wheel-dealer of our time, agrees. He said it and laid it on the line in a recent article published in Newsweek, where Mr. Pickens says, and I quote, "We are there because of oil. We import more than 50 percent of our oil. We are there to secure our supply. Otherwise it would be just another Arab fight in the desert. Let's call a spade a spade. The reason we are there is oil." Mr. Pickens is right. And so is the Secretary of State James Baker when he said last month that the lifeline of the Western industrialized nations runs to the Persian Gulf.

Sure, others have tried to glorify the purpose of deployment in the desert sands, but the real reason that American troops are stationed in the Persian Gulf is to protect the oil supply to the industrial world.

I certainly do not believe we should have rushed thousands of troops to Saudi Arabia if faced with a threatened cutoff of such exports as textiles or handmade rugs or handwoven blankets or even VCR's. The fact is we have reached that stage where our economic, political, and military policy is being driven to an ever-increasing extent by the addiction to oil.

It is a situation which certainly runs counter to our long-term national security and best interest.

Daniel Yergin, author of a recently published book entitled "The Prize," said recently about the oil and its impact on the world—he writes:

Oil prices are at the heart of world commerce and those who control the oil prices are regarded as the new masters of the global economy. And the masters of that global economy are centered in a politically unstable region, a region displaying growing hostility toward the West, indeed to the modern world in general. It is a region that has a history replete with religious fanaticism, fervent nationalism, and, of course, oil. All have combined to produce a very real threat to America and to our Western industrialized nations.

Indeed, the instability in the Persian Gulf grows more ominous by the day. Where just a few years ago most oil-producing nations in the region could

be considered pro-Western, we are all well aware that Iran, Iraq, and, yes, Kuwait, can no longer be counted upon as friends. The events in the Persian Gulf amply demonstrate our increasing vulnerability to the oil weapon wielded by producing nations. At the time of the 1973 oil embargo, Henry Kissinger, the former eminent Secretary of State, was quoted as saying that, "The embargo alters irrevocably the world as it had grown up in the postwar period and that alteration was not in favor of the oil-consuming nations like the United States."

Many patriotic Americans have tried without success to break the foreign-oil habit. I have served a decade ago as a member of the National Alcohol Fuels Commission, which spent countless hours to produce a report that outlined a general plan for lessening American dependence on foreign oil.

But the fact remains that foreign oil-producing nations have successfully manipulated the oil markets to satisfy their self-interest at the risk of the American consumer. It is no secret that Saudi Arabia, for example, has followed a pricing policy that serves to keep us hooked on their oil by discouraging domestic production, even conservation measures, and, of course, expanded use of alternative fuels like ethanol, methanol, and compressed natural gas.

They have, rightly, perceived that when our gas tanks are full, we will not pursue efforts to break the foreign-oil habit. Of course, that is a very shortsighted policy and one which has made us less free today than we were just two decades ago.

One OPEC document referred to a new pricing policy as "an effective instrument for slowing and arresting the pace of fuel substitution." And as a way of definitely discouraging the future development of high-cost oil and alternative fuels, including those produced in the United States.

In simple terms, they were saying they would price their oil to keep us addicts, to keep the United States hooked on foreign oil so we would not produce our own oil, we would not produce substitutes, we would not produce alternative fuels, but we would stay in the clasp and clutches of the foreign oil producers. And they have done a good job.

According to a recent report by the Energy Information Administration, "Oil has become an international product whose price and supply are driven by factors over which the United States has little control. Oil prices within the United States are determined more by the international oil supply situation than by the pricing practices of domestic oil companies."

What they are saying, my friends, is that America has lost control over its energy supply.

The negative impact on national security of this loss of control over our energy supply is great—and potentially disastrous.

The Secretary of State said last month, putting it in plain terms so that the average American citizen can understand it, it means loss of jobs. And that is why, we are to conclude from what he said, our troops are in the Persian Gulf.

And of course this is potentially disastrous.

Through the years, there have been calls for a national policy to make America more self-reliant in energy, but the manipulative hand of oil producers has reached down to stop those efforts, and it has been successful.

Two such efforts are outlined in Mr. Yergin's book. In 1947, with the intensification of the cold war, the Interior Department called for a crash program that would be capable—with 4 to 5 years—of producing 2 million barrels per day of synthetic fuels.

We now use about 7.5 million barrels a day of oil, 52 percent of which is imported from foreign countries. Nothing much happened from that initiative.

So in 1973, former President Nixon called for a grand new national undertaking—Project Independence—to make America more self-reliant in energy. He said at the time: "Let us set as our national goal, in the spirit of Apollo, with the determination of the Manhattan project, that by the end of this decade we will have developed the potential to meet our own energy needs without depending on any foreign energy source."

□ 1250

Nothing much happened. Why?

The ever-growing availability of cheap foreign oil made these efforts futile and uneconomic. Imported petroleum in effect killed these proposals. The manipulative hands of the foreign oil producers, maybe even in consortium with some of our domestic producers—I say maybe—kept oil prices cheap so that initiatives of a grand scale would not be perceived as needed by the American electorate.

But we should be asking, "Is oil really so much cheaper than alternative fuels?" We do not really know. We never fully explored the question of the real cost of gasoline.

If we factor in the military cost of protecting the oil supply, would the price be greater? If we factored in the health cost of the poisonous emissions of the automobiles that pollute our environment, cause cancer in humans, pulmonary diseases, respiratory infection, kill plants, take the bricks and mortar off of buildings, would the costs be greater? If we factor in the cost of heating up the environment with the emissions of the heat-containing gases into the atmosphere, as scientists predict, thereby warming the planet and

causing disruptions in our weather patterns, possibly melting of some of the ice caps and flooding of our coastal zones, would that cost add to the price at the pump?

I have heard noted scholars and statesmen observe that about one-third of the cost of our defense policy costs us about \$300 billion a year. Therefore, about a hundred billion dollars a year can be looked to as protecting our supply of energy in the Persian Gulf region, a hundred billion dollars a year, a hundred billion dollars a year.

It has been analyzed, if divided by the number of gallons that we consume each year in gasoline, it would mean that instead of about a dollar and a quarter that we pay at the pump, that we pay an additional \$4 to \$5 for the military escort. So, what is the real price of gasoline that we are paying in the United States?

And suppose the President does invade Kuwait, and suppose that, as estimates vary from 25,000 to 100,000 casualties result as a fact of that invasion, what would be the cost in human terms of protecting that oil supply? Until we know the true cost in economic terms, not in human terms, of gasoline, we will be writing our Nation's energy policy totally in the dark, the same as we have in the past, but instead it will be in the future, and that energy policy, or actually the lack of an energy policy, will guide this Nation and the future of our Nation for generations to come.

Will that mean that we will have to reinstitute the draft in order to protect that oil supply? Will we be required to station troops permanently in the Persian Gulf to protect that oil supply? What is the cost?

Mr. Speaker, I have asked for studies from the General Accounting Office, and I am promised those studies that spring on this question which I believe will be the most helpful in charting our future energy course.

So, we begin a new year, still dependent, still subject to foreign manipulation by foreign oil producers, still vulnerable to supply disruptions, which could bring our economy and our military machine to a grinding halt, still constrained in making foreign policy, still limited in our freedom as Americans because of the uncertainty of the future and our dependence on foreign oil, still so critically attached to the lifeline that leads to the Persian Gulf oil that we must send our troops to protect it.

The economic consequences of our dependency are staggering. Imported oil cost this Nation \$1 trillion 100 billion during the last decade of the 1980's. The free world, I am told, as a whole spent an incredible \$1 trillion 600 billion on oil imports during the same period, constituting the largest transfer of wealth since the Spanish looted the New World over 200 years ago. Such

a gigantic outflow of dollars has seriously aggravated our budget, complicated our fiscal affairs and balance of trade problems as a massive withdrawal of purchasing power and retarded growth in industrial countries around the world.

Mr. Speaker, it is a mindless policy to continue to borrow money from foreigners, as we do in the United States, in order to buy oil from foreigners. That is like going to the bank to borrow money to pay interest to another bank. That is what we are doing in the United States, and that leads to bankruptcy. With the economic health, indeed the very security of our Nation at stake, we cannot allow OPEC price manipulation to retard our efforts to break this cycle of addiction.

Since being appointed to the U.S. Alternative Fuel Council over a year ago, I have seen and heard clear and convincing evidence from top experts in our country that we can stop this monetary hemorrhaging by reducing our dependence on foreign oil. At a recent meeting of the Council in Philadelphia, for example, one expert from the Solar Energy Research Institute in Boulder, CO, testified that America's farmers can replace foreign suppliers in our energy needs. Farmers can replace foreigners by growing crops for ethanol production and do it cheaper.

Mr. Speaker, there are other ways to displace dependence on Persian Gulf oil. Compressed natural gas, if it was used in fleet vehicles like buses and mass transportation, would dramatically reduce our dependence on foreign oil, and that gas can be produced in the United States. Scrubbed coal, clean coal, can be used to produce electricity and, of course, electric machines can be used to replace gasoline-powered machines, even in automobiles. This could reverse the massive transfer of wealth we have seen in the last decade directing the flow of dollars toward the grain fields of America's heartland and away from the oil fields of the Middle East. The Council has called for replacing at least 25 percent of the gasoline and other traditional fuels in the Nation's vehicle fleet with alternatives by the year 2025.

□ 1300

I will introduce this copy of the Council's resolution, which I will append to my remarks today for the RECORD.

The technology is available to meet the goal of energy self-sufficiency, but we must also put with that the political will to accept that challenge, the political will that reflects a national resolve that our Nation will no longer be dependent upon oil from the Persian Gulf region. We have it. We can do it if we have the will to do it.

It is true that past efforts have failed. This effort, however, must not

fail. The time is late and too much is at stake.

Economist E.F. Schumacher said years ago that in view of all the problems involved, it was very tempting to abandon the quest for a long-term view in energy and simply to hope for the best.

That is what we did, we hoped for the best. Well, we have been doing little else than hoping for the best and getting the worst. The path our troops followed to Saudi Arabia is littered with the good intentions of past generations and political leaders. Yes, we would become self-reliant some day. We would break the cycle of dependence some day. We would keep more energy dollars at home rather than allow them to flow into the treasuries of oil-producing nations some day.

But some day never came. Now some say that doomsday looms ahead. Not doomsday in the biblical sense, but doomsday in the apocalyptic sense. War looms on the horizon only a week away.

A U.S. diplomat who served in the Middle East once warned that the greatest sin this country could commit in the energy field was inattention. But we have sinned mightily as a nation, and now we must repent and sin no more. We must change our direction. We must change our habits. We must somehow generate a national resolve. Somehow we must capture a political will that will produce a national direction, a leadership that will address a national problem.

I think the greatest problem in America today is the unwillingness to address our problems, like dependence on foreign oil. We must change this direction. We have a chance to do it. The process begins with a new policy of energy independence.

I have proposed such a policy. Others have. Many have. It is built on more self-reliance and increased use of alternative fuels, and, of course, conservation. We can save millions of barrels of oil each year with a conservation policy.

Mr. Speaker, I will insert a copy of my plan in the Record today and will also be circulating it among my colleagues in the Congress. I see it as serving as an agenda for debate. It is not all-inclusive, but the basic idea is to displace our dependence on Arab oil.

I saw a farmer the other day show that we use about 5 percent of our oil from the Persian Gulf region. There are some 16½ million acres of land that are set aside and not being used in order to comply with the USDA farm program, and about 4 billion bushels of grain could be grown on that land producing about 10 billion gallons of ethanol, which could be blended with gasoline to run our automobiles and displace that dependence on foreign oil.

Why aren't we doing that? It is because we do not have a national policy to do that.

The U.S. Alternative Fuels Council has passed a resolution which is a modest step that calls for displacing 25 percent of our gasoline and other traditional fuels in the Nation's vehicle fleet by the year 2005. Surely we can achieve that. Both the plan and the resolution are only beginnings. But there can be no end to a journey without a beginning.

There is a growing support for change of direction. America now seems to be ready to accept a new kind of leadership which will break our addiction to imported oil, particularly that oil that derives from the Persian Gulf.

Our people do not want their Nation to be in the position of permanently stationing troops in the Middle East in order to secure our oil supply that is constantly threatened by the instability there. But without taking action to reverse the direction, there is little choice but to send our troops.

Not too long ago a Denver taxicab driver told me that American soldiers should not have to die so that we could keep our gas tanks full. He said, "It is time for Americans to stand up and do something about it."

That is what we are here today for, to do something about it, to take a step in the right direction. It will be up to the 102d Congress to set a new direction for America, one that removes us from the position of possibly having to trade blood for gasoline. A new energy security policy for the Nation is well worth the fight.

If ever there was a time for Congress to show leadership, if ever there was a time for Congress to show the worth of this institution, to counter the public perception of this body as gridlocked, wimpy, and incapable of action, it is now, by saving America from a dangerous dependence on foreign oil, particularly that coming from the unstable Middle East.

Mr. Speaker, I will shortly ask Members to join me in supporting an energy security policy for the Nation. In underlining the necessity for such a policy, I cite the warning of former Egyptian President Abdul Nasser. He said, almost four decades ago, "Without petroleum, all of the machines and tools of the industrial world are mere pieces of iron, rusty, motionless, lifeless."

He might have added, our military hardware are nothing but piles of sophisticated but worthless junk.

Mr. Speaker, we must lead America away from the edge of this precipice, away from the slavery of dependence, to the freedom of independence. In 1776 we declared our independence from foreign domination. In 1991 we should proclaim a new declaration of independence, this time from the dominance made possible from foreign oil.

A French official observed following World War I that oil was the blood of the Earth. I can only pray now that American blood does not have to be spilled in the sands of the Middle East to ensure that oil will continue to flow to our shores.

[U.S. Alternative Fuels Council]

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE BILL ALEXANDER, SUMMARY OF ENERGY SECURITY POLICY GOALS, DECEMBER 12, 1990

During the period beginning with the first oil boycott in 1973, a number of historic events related to our national energy sources occurred:

The United States, which now imports about 52% of its oil, has effectively lost control of its energy supply—leaving our economy vulnerable to supply disruptions.

The U.S. oil supply from the Persian Gulf has been interrupted three times in the past 20 years with serious economic effects. The most recent disruption threat left us little choice but to deploy U.S. troops to protect Middle East sources. The lives of hundreds of thousands of American men and women are at risk.

Imported oil cost this country \$1.1 trillion during the decade of the 1980s with an additional annual expenditure of approximately \$100 billion to secure delivery, particularly from the politically unstable Persian Gulf region.

In effect, the U.S. borrows from foreigners to purchase oil from foreigners causing a serious drain on the vitality of the economy thereby weakening our strategic position.

The world energy supply is now being manipulated by foreign producers. It is well known, for example, that Kuwait exercised a price-and-supply policy within the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) intended to discourage oil substitution and conservation by consuming nations.

The Energy Information Administration said in a recently released report that "oil has become an international product whose price and supply are driven by factors over which the United States has little control. Oil prices within the United States are determined more by the international oil supply situation than by the pricing practices of domestic oil companies."

These, and other well known facts, have made it conspicuously obvious that the economy and security of the nation are in jeopardy and will be as long as the current dangerous dependence on a costly and unstable energy supply continues.

Congress should declare a national emergency and immediately proceed to formulate a National Energy Security Policy to include, but not be limited to, the following titles:

1. Conservation,
2. Conversion,
3. Research and Development,
4. Demonstration,
5. Production,
6. Participation,
7. Strategic Energy Reserve, and
8. Urgency.

1. Conservation: It shall be the national purpose to ensure the security of the nation and the health of the economy by entering upon a program aimed at conserving all forms of energy.

Inducements should be developed and implemented to promote conservation in both the public and private sectors.

2. Conversion: It shall be the policy of the nation to encourage conversion from oil to

alternate sources of energy, with a particular emphasis on displacing oil from the politically unstable Persian Gulf region.

Such conversions might be accomplished by:

A. Providing incentives to convert motor vehicle fleets from gasoline and diesel to compressed natural gas, LPG, electricity, methanol and ethanol.

B. Enacting laws at federal, state and local levels mandating conversion of government-owned vehicles to blended fuels and "neat" fuels.

C. Using "scrubbed coal" instead of oil to generate electricity.

D. Developing incentives to encourage expanded use of alternate fuels at all levels, including consumers and auto manufacturers.

E. A review of federal, state and local laws and regulations causing disincentives for alternative energy must be undertaken. Bureaucracy is especially counter-productive at the state level.

F. Federal, state and local environmental authorities must develop laws that are compatible with the energy security policy with special emphasis on accommodating storage and transportation of alternative motor vehicle fuels.

In establishing priorities, it should be noted that the transportation sector, which currently accounts for two thirds of the oil consumed in this country, affords us the best opportunity to make near-term gains in meeting this vital national goal.

3. Research and Development: That it shall be the policy of the United States to provide research and development funding in the alternative fuels field and that such funding be given a top priority designation. That all government agencies, including NASA, be required to provide research talent and other resources to attain a greater degree of self-sufficiency in the energy field.

4. Demonstration: In order to obtain the best and most credible information on the state of the art of alternative fuels and how they might best reduce our current dependence on foreign oil, funding for demonstration projects should also receive a high priority designation. We should also closely study the example offered by countries such as Brazil and New Zealand which have already made great progress in the development and use of alternative fuels.

We should encourage the involvement of such institutions as the United Nations Center for Science and Technology for Development in accomplishing this goal for other energy deficient nations.

5. Production: With a goal of making this country more reliant on its own natural resources, incentives should be devised to encourage the production both of U.S. oil and gas as well as alternative fuels. Production policies should balance national security, economic and environmental concerns with national energy needs.

One example of production initiatives would be to induce utilization of the almost 17 million acres of farm land now lying fallow to meet requirements of federal farm programs for ethanol production.

Oil companies should be encouraged to follow the example of Phillips Petroleum Company to become energy companies—producing not only conventional products, but expanding into the alternative fuels field. Sun Oil and Occidental have also shown leadership.

6. Participation: It is essential that a strong partnership be formed linking consumers, federal, state and local governments and the corporate sector if we are to achieve

the goal of increased self reliance in the energy field. We should follow the example of Federal Express Corporation which has made its fleet available for the most comprehensive test of alternative fuels in the history of the nation. The test, which is being conducted in the Los Angeles Basin, is the type government/private sector partnership which will advance the use of alternative fuels and make this nation more secure.

The Union Oil company "old-car buy back program" is a policy that should be applauded for its conservation, environmental and economic effects!

Atlantic-Richfield and Chevron deserve national appreciation for acceptance of public policy responsibility.

7. Strategic Energy Reserve: The Strategic Petroleum Reserve should be changed to become the Strategic Energy Reserve to include the storage of other forms of alternative energy such as ethanol, methanol and others.

8. Urgency: Time is of the essence. A sense of national urgency must be stated. Immediate steps should be made to formulate plans and put a national energy security policy into effect!

These proposals, in combination with others, will help this nation proclaim a new Declaration of Independence, from foreign domination.

RESOLUTION OF THE U.S. ALTERNATIVE FUELS COUNCIL, DECEMBER 12, 1990

Resolved, That the President, the Congress, and the private sector proceed forthwith to establish a national energy security policy for the commercialization of alternative fuels; Be it further

Resolved, That the federal government should promptly take steps to assist the marketplace and remove impediments to the widespread commercialization of alternative motor vehicle fuels. Legislation and administrative action should carefully evaluate costs and benefits of alternative fuels, measures such as fuel economy incentives, tax incentives, research and demonstration, accelerated fleet purchases, cooperation with states and localities, and other steps. The program should make progress from year to year with a goal that, by the year 2005, alternative fuels will be used for at least 25 percent of all motor vehicle miles traveled. These alternative fuels should be derived from resources other than petroleum, and the steps taken to promote alternative fuels should be consistent with our environmental laws. The term "alternative fuels" in this resolution includes electricity, natural gas, methanol, ethanol, LPG, hydrogen, and non-petroleum components of reformulated gasoline and diesel.

□ 1310

GIVE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS LONGER TO WORK

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. PEASE] is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. PEASE. Mr. Speaker, I am including in today's proceedings an article from the Washington Post of yesterday from which I will quote extensively during my remarks.

Mr. Speaker, I rise to talk about the Persian Gulf as did my colleague, the gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. ALEXANDER], who preceded me.

I would like to begin by commending the gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. ALEXANDER] for his thoughtful remarks for raising some of the questions that need to be raised in our country in the next 8 days. I am deeply disturbed, Mr. Speaker, by what I see happening in our country vis-a-vis the Persian Gulf policy. I see us moving almost inexorably toward war in the Persian Gulf. I think that would be a tragic error for our country.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to stress at the outset that I was an initial supporter of President Bush's efforts in the Persian Gulf. When, very shortly after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, the President began to deploy American military personnel in the Persian Gulf, I applauded him. I thought that was a good move, because at that time, as we know, we were concerned about Saudi Arabia and whether Iraq would move on from Kuwait and invade Saudi Arabia. I also was very supportive of President Bush when he and his officials sought and achieved official condemnation by the United Nations of the Iraqi attack on Kuwait.

Similarly, I was supportive of President Bush when he organized through the United Nations an economic boycott against Iraq and, in general, when he was able to achieve an international consensus across ideological grounds, across the geography of our world, across Third World, first world divides, a consensus that what Iraq did was unacceptable and that Iraq had to withdraw from Kuwait. I really felt that for the first 2 months President Bush and his advisers were nothing short of brilliant in the way that they responded to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and were able to marshal an international consensus against Iraq.

My misgivings about President Bush's policy began to develop at the very end of October after Congress had adjourned for the year when the President changed the character of our efforts in the Persian Gulf from defensive, protecting Saudi Arabia from invasion, to offensive, to the idea that if Saddam Hussein did not withdraw from Kuwait that we would use military force to eject Iraq from Kuwait.

I have been disturbed that offensive posture had been developed and amplified and increased over the last couple of months, and I have been extremely disturbed by the increasingly truculent language of President Bush when he refers to Saddam Hussein personally and to Iraq.

Mr. Speaker, that is why I have chosen to take the floor today. There are, of course, very few people here in the Chamber. I think there ought to be a lot more, and I hope, and I know, that there will be as this week progresses, because the Speaker has just announced that beginning on Thursday Congress, caucuses of the House, Democratic and Republican, will debate the

issue, and that by Friday we will have a full-blown debate here on the floor of the House. I think that is entirely in order.

But I choose to come here today to begin in my own small way the public debate which I think is critically important if we are to avoid war in the Persian Gulf.

There are two questions which we have before us as a Congress and as the American people. First is: What is the role of Congress if the President contemplates using force against Iraq? And, second, if the United States should attack Iraq, if it has not withdrawn from Kuwait by January 15, in other words, first question, what is the legitimate role of Congress under the Constitution of the United States; second question, should the United States attack Iraq if it has not withdrawn from Kuwait by January 15?

Mr. Speaker, there is no doubt about my position regarding the role of Congress. I was one of several dozen Members of Congress who served as plaintiffs in a suit filed back at the end of October in Federal district court seeking to make it crystal clear that the Constitution gives Congress, and only Congress, the right to declare war. We congressional plaintiffs were joined in an *amicus curiae* brief by eight or so very distinguished constitutional scholars in the United States who agreed with our position.

When the case was heard in Judge Green's court in Federal district court, Judge Green agreed with the substance of our position, that it is the right of Congress, and only Congress, to initiate war against another country.

For procedural reasons, Judge Green chose not to try to enjoin President Bush from going to war, but as I say, he had no disagreement with us at all on the substance.

He said, furthermore, that if a majority of the Members of Congress, a majority, were to support the position in a vote that there should be no action without congressional authority, that he might well reconsider and issue an injunction against the executive branch.

Notwithstanding Judge Green's decision, President Bush, Secretary Cheney, and Secretary Baker have repeatedly over the last several weeks said that they do not really think that Congress does have a role, that if the President decides by himself, one single individual, to commit American troops to battle in the Persian Gulf and Kuwait or Iraq, that he has the authority to do that.

□ 1320

I think that is a mistaken view of the Constitution of the United States, and I think it is setting up our country for a tragedy of unparalleled proportions. So when Congress meets this Thursday and this Friday, and perhaps into Sat-

urday, I hope that the first order of business will be whether or not Congress will assert its authority to either declare war or choose not to declare war. I hope that there will be widespread agreement within the membership of the House and of the Senate that we should protect our own prerogatives.

The second question regarding that, whether offensive actions should be undertaken or not, if Iraq does not withdraw from Kuwait by January 15, I have been equally clear in my position. I have stated that position several times over the last 2 months in my own congressional district. That view is that the United States should not initiate offensive action against Iraq until and unless the economic sanctions already approved by the United Nations have every opportunity to work. When I say "every opportunity," I do not mean 2 weeks or 2 months. I mean a year or 18 months or longer, if that is necessary.

A lot of people, myself included, but certainly more knowledgeable experts than myself, believe that economic sanctions, if given the opportunity over a period of time, will work. Just yesterday, Mr. Speaker, my views on the question of using force against Iraq received explication, elaboration, and support in a long and thoughtful and authoritative article in the Washington Post. Support for my position came, I must say, from a rather unlikely source, that source being Paul Nitze, who is a major adviser to Republican Presidents, particularly President Reagan, on the subject of arms control. Paul Nitze is known around this town as a hawk of major proportions. No one ever accused Paul Nitze of being soft on the enemies of the United States. Paul Nitze used to head an organization called the Committee on Present Danger, if memory is correct. The present danger that he saw was that the United States would sign arms control agreements with the Soviet Union, which would inadequately protect the United States.

Paul Nitze, I think, as much as anyone else during the administration of President Carter and on into that of President Reagan was responsible for causing the United States to be cautious about its approach to agreements with the Soviet Union.

Now, Paul Nitze sees quite another present danger to the United States, and the new present danger is not from the Soviet Union but from our embroilment in the Persian Gulf in a way that we will find very difficult to get out of. Therefore, because Paul Nitze and his coauthor, Michael Stafford of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, captured so well much of what I have been saying over the last 2 months, I would like to quote extensively from that article.

Mr. Nitze and Mr. Stafford talk about the new military doctrine of overwhelming force, which the President is apparently planning to use in Iraq. He says, or they say:

That will very probably result in thousands of American casualties as well as widespread death and destruction in Kuwait and Iraq.

Furthermore, and I think this is very essential, they believe that United States use of force in Iraq will also have severe long-term impact upon United States public opinion, on United States standing in the Middle East, and on other key American interests.

They go on to say, and they are historians, one of the most dangerous forms of human error is forgetting what one is trying to achieve. In the gulf crisis, they say, it is crucial that we look beyond our anger at Saddam Hussein, and I think all of us are angry at Saddam Hussein, and remind ourselves of precisely what our interests are, and what it is that they are seeking to accomplish.

Mr. Speaker, it seems to me that President Bush has not done that, or if he had, he has not heeded the lessons that could be learned from such review. Certainly, he has not shared with the American people his thinking on this issue.

The authors of this article say that our main goal should be to establish a precedent for a new post-cold war era in which the community of nations, working through the United Nations and other organizations, can ensure that would-be aggressors do not profit from invasion, coercion, or force. That ought to be our No. 1 goal, to use the experience of Iraq and Kuwait and our response to it as a precedent, that we can use elsewhere around the world. Subordinate goals, say Mr. Nitze and Mr. Stafford, should be to avoid major disruptions in the regional balance of power in the Middle East, to maintain stability in the world oil market, and to deny Saddam the ability to build weapons of mass destruction, including atomic bombs, and to prevent, and this is important to remember, to prevent the widespread use of such weapons elsewhere in the region.

Mr. Nitze and Mr. Stafford go on to say, "In our view, all-out war" of the kind which President Bush is apparently contemplating, "promises the least success in achieving the objectives that I have just outlined in this article." First, they say, that "It would not necessarily discourage other potential aggressors. Defeating Saddam Hussein promptly in an all-out war would send an unequivocal signal that this aggression had not been tolerated. But if casualties were high, U.S. sentiment probably would be driven toward a more isolationist posture," which would make it difficult to use this experience as a precedent elsewhere in the world.

As I said earlier, it is my view, as well as that of Mr. Nitze and Mr. Stafford, that our chief goal ought to be to use this exercise for the precedent that could be established.

Second, say Mr. Nitze and Mr. Stafford:

Middle East instability has already been exacerbated by the rallying of Moslem extremists toward Iraq, and no option is likely to be very successful at the delicate task of restoring a balance while shoring up friendly but shaky regimes.

They say:

Even a successful all-out war could throw the Middle East into chaos. With the destruction of much of Iraq's military capability, Syria and Iran could be expected to vie for regional dominance. Other nations—including Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt—could be destabilized, with strong internal forces rising in opposition, enraged by their governments' collaboration with Americans who had killed thousands of their Arab brothers.

□ 1330

Mr. Speaker, most American citizens do not know a lot about the Middle East. Frankly, that is not at the top of their agenda, nor should it be. They elect Representatives like ourselves and like the President to think in detail about the ramifications of various policies around the world and then to take those ramifications into account; but if Americans were to read at all the history of the Middle East, they would know that at our peril do we turn the war, the conflict against Iraq, into an armed conflict which will be perceived by Moslems, 900 million Moslems, as a battle between the imperialist United States and the Moslem world. And believe me, if we take the course of starting a war in Iraq where we wind up killing tens of thousands of Iraqis, and I have little doubt that that would be the result, then we are going to unleash an antiimperialist, anti-Western nation, anti-American move among Moslems which we will long regret.

The leadership of Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and many other countries in the Moslem world will find it nearly impossible to sustain a position of friendship and support for the United States against the internal radicals of their own countries who will be saying that the United States is killing Moslems, that the United States is an imperialist power, and that if the current leaders of Saudi Arabia and Jordan and Egypt will not step in to oppose the United States, then the leadership of those countries ought to be overturned, so we will be creating a very, very great potential for an enormous upheaval in the Middle East, and surely that is not in our best interests.

Third, according to Mr. Nitze and Mr. Stafford, with instability of the Middle East, oil supplies would remain quite uncertain. If Syria or Iran replaced Iraq as the potentially dominant regional power, or if friendly govern-

ments in Saudi Arabia and other oil-producing countries were overthrown by hostile, fundamentalist groups, oil supplies would be threatened even more than they are now, and surely that is not in the interests of our country or of the Western industrial world.

In sum, again quoting Mr. Nitze and Mr. Stafford, the all-out war option seems highly counterproductive in the long run and certainly not worth the thousands of lives that it would cost.

Much more promising, they say, is continued reliance on economic sanctions, because the sanctions would be more likely to produce a more stable world order, that this option would likely be less disruptive to regional stability, and that while oil supplies would remain uncertain, the situation would be better than if we had armed conflict.

Let me conclude my quotations from these two distinguished gentlemen with their own conclusion:

For the past generation, Americans have regretted that in Vietnam, we let the passions of the moment and a lack of healthy skepticism toward presidential claims obscure a clear-headed assessment of our national interests. The result was that we were driven into a costly, divisive, and ultimately counterproductive expansion of a war that lacked adequate public support. Let's not spend the next generation wondering how we came to repeat that mistake.

Mr. Speaker, as I say, this Thursday or Friday Congress will be debating this issue. We will be debating the wisdom of whether to embroil American troops in the Persian Gulf. We will be debating, make no mistake about it, whether to send thousands, 10,000, 20,000, 30,000, 40,000 or more American young people to their deaths in the Persian Gulf. It seems to me we ought to be very clear about what our national interests are, what our goals are, and what our motives are before we as a nation take that fateful step.

Both issues will be before the Congress; one, the role of the Congress itself in making war or not making war, and I hope that a majority of my colleagues will agree on the interpretation of the U.S. Congress which says that only the Congress can declare war.

I hope that between now and Thursday, American citizens around this great country of ours will take the time to talk and communicate with their own Members of Congress to let them know how they feel about the issue.

The other issue before us will be the use of force against Iraq. In relation to that issue, I think it is especially important that American citizens between now and Thursday let their Congressmen know how they feel about the issue of sending American troops on the offense against Saddam Hussein.

If Congress asserts its prerogatives under the Constitution and says that the President ought to ask Congress for permission before initiating war,

almost certainly President Bush will immediately ask for that approval. Congress may well be inclined to give it to him so as not, so the argument goes, to undercut the position of the President prior to January 15.

As I said before, I think it would be a terrible mistake for us to do that.

A couple weeks ago I was in my district talking to a group of people and one man said, "I guess we are going to have to go to war against Iraq."

I said, "Why?"

And he said, "Because if we did not after all the President has said over the last couple months, that it would make the President look bad. So therefore we have to follow through and invade Iraq."

What I said to him was, "If I have to weigh in the balance on the one hand making the President of the United States lose some face, and on the other hand running a very great risk of losing 20,000 or 30,000 American lives, I will choose making the President look bad every time, or making the Congress look bad or making any other institution look bad."

The President may look bad, Secretary Baker may and Secretary Cheney may, because they have spent the last 2 months getting themselves farther and farther out on the limb with their truculent language so that they do not have the options that they might have had 2 months ago, with appearing to back down; but I think anybody who is wise, anybody who is willing to weigh the real odds and the real consequences of offensive action, would be willing to say, "All right, they talked about offensive action, I still think they may have to do it, but all right, I am willing to say we will give the economic sanctions longer, much longer to work."

□ 1340

Mr. Speaker, I hope that the President of the United States has the wisdom to do that and if he does not, that the Congress has the wisdom to require him to do that.

WAR WHETHER WE NEED IT OR NOT?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. NEAL] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. NEAL of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, although I am convinced that Saddam Hussein is a menace to the world and must be contained, I am equally convinced that economic sanctions, backed up by multinational force against him, should be given a full opportunity to succeed before going to war.

An article in the Washington Post of Sunday, January 6, 1991, by Paul H. Nitze and Michael F. Stafford, points out that there is a strong and logical alternative to going to war in the Persian Gulf. Mr. Nitze was, of course,

a special advisor to President Reagan, and is an expert on arms control and foreign affairs.

I commend this important statement to my colleagues, to the Bush administration, and to anyone who is concerned about the Gulf crisis. I ask that it be reprinted in its entirety in the RECORD. The article follows:

[From the Washington Post, Jan. 6, 1991]

WAR WHETHER WE NEED IT OR NOT?

(By Paul H. Nitze and Michael F. Stafford)

We are rushing headlong into all-out war in the Persian Gulf. There is an alternative to this painful course. Continued reliance on the United Nations embargo—possibly augmented by air strikes—promises a much more favorable result.

If this week's last-minute round of diplomacy fails and the United States applies its new military doctrine of overwhelming force, the carnage will be severe—probably thousands of American casualties, as well as widespread death and destruction in Kuwait and Iraq. A massive clash with Saddam Hussein's well-entrenched forces on the ground as well as in the air also will have severe long-term impact on U.S. public opinion, U.S. standing in the Middle East and other key American interests.

One of the most dangerous forms of human error is forgetting what one is trying to achieve. In the Gulf crisis, it is crucial that we look beyond our anger at Saddam and remind ourselves of precisely what U.S. interests are in the crisis and what we seek to accomplish. Underlying our support for the United Nations' resolutions calling for Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait and allow the restoration of the Kuwaiti government are several important objectives.

Our main goal should be to establish a precedent for a new post-Cold War era, in which the community of nations, working through the United Nations and other organizations, can insure that would-be aggressors do not profit from invasion, coercion and force.

Subordinate goals should be:

To avoid major disruptions in the regional balance of power in the Middle East, and at the same time to avoid encouraging internal foes of friendly regimes;

To maintain stability in the world oil market, which has adjusted to the loss of Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil, (8 percent of pre-crisis world supply), by insuring that Saddam cannot follow up his aggression against Kuwait so as to eventually gain leverage over Saudi oil (9 percent of world supplies) or of the entire Middle East's (30 percent);

To deny Saddam the ability to field weapons of mass destruction, including an atomic bomb; and to prevent the spread of such weapons elsewhere in the region.

To achieve these goals, the United States and its international partners have available a choice among two general courses of action:

The first is all-out war, including heavy reliance on the prompt offensive use of ground forces. U.S. Gulf commander Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf has said it could take up to six months to win such a conflict. If we get bogged down, it could take longer. In addition to troop losses, such a campaign would cost about \$50-60 billion, plus that much or more in indirect expenditures such as future medical and other care for the casualties. Efforts to eliminate Saddam or occupy Iraq could take longer and cost more.

The second is continued sanctions, possibly augmented by air strikes. This course would balance power restraint; it would measure out sufficient force to make unmistakable to

Iraq and the rest of the world the adverse consequences of aggression.

We would continue the international embargo, including its enforcement by the naval blockade. To defend Saudi Arabia, we would retain and rotate a sustainable deployment of ground forces, a level lower than the force there now.

Under the current international embargo, only a trickle of goods is getting in or out of Iraq; oil exports and earnings are nil and civilian production is estimated to be down by about 40 percent. In time, lack of spare parts will erode Iraq's military capabilities, and civilian and military production will fall further.

But over the next six to 12 months, it may become evident that a blockade by itself will not do the job. In that case, we would favor supplementing the naval blockade with selected but powerful air strikes.

Before this step was taken, however, it would be important that our allies and the American people be convinced that sanctions alone had been given a full chance to work and had failed. It would also be important that the public be better convinced that the interests at stake justified use of military force.

While the shortcomings of strategic air campaigns are well known, modern air delivery systems can inflict great damage on the Iraqi war machine and the economy. Combined with the naval blockade, a well-directed air assault could force Iraqi capitulation. And if, over months, it did not achieve its goal, there remains the possibility of a later ground attack against greatly weakened Iraqi forces.

In our view, all-out war promises the least success in achieving the objectives we have outlined.

First, it would not necessarily discourage other potential aggressors. Defeating Saddam Hussein promptly in an all-out war would send an unequivocal signal that this aggression had not been tolerated. But if casualties were high, U.S. sentiment probably would be driven toward a more isolationist posture. Many Americans would be dismayed by the carnage and resentful that our allies were not paying a similar price. (The seeds of such resentment already exist.) They could be expected to oppose any comparable U.S. role in the future. The message would be that the United States had neither the inclination to work in concert with other nations nor the stomach to repeat the anti-Iraq action. Many of our current collaborators, who are ambivalent at best about the war option, might also lose interest in future cooperation with us. A world of growing brutality and chaos would become a likely prospect.

Second, Middle East instability has already been exacerbated by the rallying of Moslem extremists toward Iraq, and no option is likely to be very successful at the delicate task of restoring a balance while shoring up friendly but shaky regimes.

But even a successful all-out war could throw the Middle East into chaos. With the destruction of much of Iraq's military capability, Syria and Iran could be expected to vie for regional domination. Other nations—including Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt—could be destabilized, with strong internal forces rising in opposition, enraged by their governments' collaboration with Americans who had killed thousands of their Arab brothers. In all this ferment, U.S. influence could be reduced to shoring up friendly regimes, if we had the stomach for it. All these troubles would be exacerbated if Saddam were to succeed in drawing Israel into the war.

Third, with instability in the Middle East, oil supplies would remain quite uncertain. If Syria or Iran replaced Iraq as the potentially dominant regional power, or if friendly governments in Saudi Arabia and other oil-producing countries were overthrown by hostile, fundamentalist groups, supplies would be threatened once more.

Finally, a well-executed attack on Iraq could sharply set back its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction but also could create problems elsewhere in the region. The crisis has already had this effect; the Saudis, for example, are reported to be newly seeking to buy a nuclear weapon. The increased regional instability we can expect after a war can only heighten these incentives.

In sum, the all-out war option seems highly counterproductive in the long term and certainly not worth the thousands of lives it would cost.

Much more promising is continued reliance on sanctions.

First, successful sanctions would be most likely to produce a stable world order. Critical to this outcome is that a substantially lower level of violence would be more likely to result in continued public support for an active U.S. international role.

Second, this option would likely be less disruptive to regional stability. But any approach that left much of Iraq's military capability intact would produce a need to retain a peacekeeping force on the front lines, either in Kuwait or Saudi Arabia, and perhaps elsewhere. While internal destabilization in other countries of the region would remain a concern, this threat would be lower than that produced by all-out war, especially if the peacekeeping force were primarily Arab.

Third, although oil supplies would remain uncertain, we would be better able to reduce our vulnerability to disruption of those supplies. The key is the strategic petroleum reserve, which provides us an assured source of oil which we can use to make up supply shortfalls or dampen price hikes an unfriendly nation might seek to impose. The reserve already holds almost 600 million barrels, enough for us to increase market supply by over 3 million barrels a day (more than we import from all Arab OPEC nations) for as long as six months. For about \$15 billion, or a fraction of the estimated cost of a prompt, all-out war, we could increase the reserve to the 1 billion barrels recommended by most experts. In the longer term, we could impose an oil tariff to induce conservation (while also generating revenues) and reverse cutbacks in development of alternative energy sources.

Finally, the key to halting proliferation in the region lies not merely with what we do in this immediate crisis but rather in a sustained campaign among potential suppliers to cut off sources of critical materials and technical cooperation. Successful sanctions would be most likely to encourage such a campaign, but they must be supplemented by provisions for continued International Atomic Energy Agency inspections and additional U.N. inspections to ensure supplies remain stemmed.

On all counts, therefore, the sanctions-air strikes approach promises to serve U.S. interests better than a prompt, all-out war.

Some argue that the threat of all-out war is the key element in the U.S. approach—a weapon in itself—and that Saddam must be convinced that the use of overwhelming force is imminent before he will back down. Arguments that question the all-out war option, they contend, undermine that strategy.

But the momentum toward such a war whose results threaten to be so costly, may have become dangerously irreversible. War may occur whether it serves our purposes or not.

For the past generation, Americans have regretted that in Vietnam, we let the passions of the moment and a lack of healthy skepticism toward presidential claims obscure a clear-headed assessment of our national interests. The result was that we were driven into a costly, divisive, and ultimately counterproductive expansion of war that lacked adequate public support. Let's not spend the next generation wondering how we came to repeat that mistake.

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

(The following Member (at the request of Mr. CONTE) to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. GINGRICH, for 60 minutes, on January 11, 16, and 18.

(The following Members (at the request of Mrs. SCHROEDER) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. ANNUNZIO, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. PEASE, for 60 minutes, today.

Mr. WISE, for 60 minutes, today.

Mr. ALEXANDER, for 60 minutes, on January 10.

Mr. PEASE, for 60 minutes each day, on January 9, 10, and 11.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY, for 60 minutes, on January 9.

Mrs. BOXER, for 60 minutes each day, on January 10 and 11.

Mr. MILLER of California, for 60 minutes each day, on January 10 and 11.

Mr. DOWNEY, for 60 minutes each day, on January 10 and 11.

Mr. LEWIS of Georgia, for 60 minutes each day, on January 10 and 11.

Mr. RUSSO, for 60 minutes each day, on January 10 and 11.

Mr. WISE, for 60 minutes, on January 11.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. PEASE) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. NEAL of North Carolina, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. COSTELLO, for 60 minutes, on January 9.

Mr. WASHINGTON, for 60 minutes, on January 9.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

By unanimous consent, permission to revise and extend remarks was granted to:

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. CONTE) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. YOUNG of Florida.

Mr. LEWIS of California in two instances.

(The following Members (at the request of Mrs. SCHROEDER) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. TRAFICANT.

Mr. BONIOR in four instances.

Mr. MONTGOMERY in two instances.

Mr. ANDERSON in 10 instances.

Mr. GONZALEZ in 10 instances.

Mr. BROWN of California in 10 instances.

Mr. ANNUNZIO in six instances.

Mrs. LLOYD in five instances.

Mr. HAMILTON in 10 instances.

Mr. DE LA GARZA in 10 instances.

Mr. JACOBS.

Mr. APPELGATE.

Mr. OWENS of New York.

Mr. BENNETT in three instances.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. PEASE. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 1 o'clock and 41 minutes p.m.), under its previous order, the House adjourned until Wednesday, January 9, 1991, at 12 noon.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

157. A letter from the Assistant Secretary for Financial Management, Department of the Army, transmitting a report on the value of property, supplies, and commodities provided by the Berlin magistrate for the quarter July 1, 1990, through September 30, 1990, pursuant to Public Law 101-165, sec. 9008 (103 Stat. 1130); to the Committee on Appropriations.

158. A letter from the Architect of the Capitol, transmitting the report of expenditures of appropriations during the period April 1, 1990 through September 30, 1990, pursuant to 40 U.S.C. 162b; to the Committee on Appropriations.

159. A letter from the Deputy Under Secretary for Acquisition, Department of Defense, transmitting certification that the Department of the Air Force's C-17A program is essential to the national security, has no alternative that would cost less, its new estimates are reasonable and its management structure is adequate, pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 2433(e)(1); to the Committee on Armed Services.

160. A letter from the Deputy Under Secretary for Acquisition, Department of Defense, transmitting certification that the Family of Heavy Tactical Vehicles Palletized Load System Program is essential to the national security, has no alternative that would cost less, its new estimates are reasonable and its management structure is adequate, pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 2433(e)(1); to the Committee on Armed Services.

161. A letter from the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Procurement, Department of Defense, transmitting notification that the report required by section 801 the fiscal year 1989 National Defense Authorization Act will be delayed and is expected to be completed by December, 1990, pursuant to Public Law 100-456, section 801(a) (102 Stat. 2007); to the Committee on Armed Services.

162. A letter from the Secretary of the Navy, transmitting notification that the UHF Follow-on Satellite Program has breached the unit cost by more than 15 percent, pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 2431(b)(3)(A); to the Committee on Armed Services.

163. A letter from the Chief of Legislative Liaison, Department of the Army, transmitting a cost-comparison study of the commissary shelf stocking function at the U.S. Army Commissary, Fort Drum, NY; to the Committee on Armed Services.

164. A letter from the Director, Office of Administration and Management, Department of Defense, transmitting the Secretary of the Army's determination and findings indicating the necessity to exclude the clause from a proposed contract with the Government of Sweden, pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 2313(c); to the Committee on Armed Services.

165. A letter from the Director, Administration and Management, Office of the Secretary of Defense, transmitting the Defense Logistics Agency determination and findings indicating the necessity to exclude the clause from a proposed contract with the Government of Somalia, pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 2313(c); to the Committee on Armed Services.

166. A letter from the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, transmitting a report on discount points and interest rates as related to loan size for FHA-insured mortgages, pursuant to Public Law 100-242, section 419(c) (101 Stat. 1913); to the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs.

167. A letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, transmitting an annual report on the operations of the exchange stabilization fund [ESF] for fiscal year 1989, pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 5302(c)(2); to the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs.

168. A letter from the Deputy Secretary, Department of Housing and Urban Development, transmitting a report on HUD's denial of FNMA's request for approval of a program to purchase debt obligations that are secured by conventional mortgages or by securities backed by conventional mortgages; to the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs.

169. A letter from the President and Chairman, Export-Import Bank of the United States, transmitting a report on the tied-aid and partially united-aid credits offers by the Bank, pursuant to Public Law 99-472, section 19 (100 Stat. 1207); to the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs.

170. A letter from the Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, transmitting a study of the desirability and feasibility of a risk-based deposit insurance premium system, pursuant to 12 U.S.C. 1827 nt.; to the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs.

171. A letter from the President of the Oversight Board and Executive Director of the Resolution Trust Corporation, transmitting a report on the activities and efforts of the RTC, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Oversight Board, pursuant to Public Law 101-73, section 501(a) (103 Stat. 387); to the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs.

172. A letter from the Acting Secretary of Labor, transmitting a copy of their annual report for fiscal year 1989; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

173. A letter from the Administrator, Energy Information Administration, transmitting the third quarter 1990 report on status of U.S. coal imports, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 7277(a); to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

174. A letter from the Secretary of Energy, transmitting the quarterly report on the strategic petroleum reserve during the period July 1, 1990, through September 30, 1990, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 6245(a); to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

175. A letter from the Secretary of Energy, transmitting the quarterly report on the strategic petroleum reserve during the period April 1, 1990, through June 30, 1990, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 6245(a); to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

176. A letter from the Secretary of Energy, transmitting the report for fiscal year 1989 on Federal Government Energy Management and Conservation Programs, pursuant to Public Law 100-615, section 2(a) (102 Stat. 3188); to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

177. A letter from the Advisory Panel on Alzheimer's Disease, transmitting the second report on administrative and legislative actions to improve services for individuals with Alzheimer's disease and related dementias, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 679; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

178. A letter from the Assistant General Counsel, Department of Energy, transmitting a notice of a meeting related to the International Energy Program to be held on December 5, 1990, at the OECD, in Paris, France; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

179. A letter from the Director, Office of Alcohol Fuels, Department of Energy, transmitting a notice that the report and termination plan of the activities of the Office of Alcohol Fuels is forthcoming, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 8818(c)(2); to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

180. A letter from the Inspector General, Department of Energy, transmitting a report on the audit of the DOE's use of the EPA's Superfund moneys for fiscal year 1989, pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 7501 nt.; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

181. A letter from the Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting a second interim report entitled "Medical Waste Management In The United States", pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 6992g; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

182. A letter from the Inspector General, Federal Emergency Management Agency, transmitting an audit report on the FEMA's administration of the permanent and temporary relocation components of the Superfund Program, pursuant to Public Law 99-499, section 120(e)(5) (100 Stat. 1669); to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

183. A letter from the Inspector General, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, transmitting the audit of the NASA/EPA Superfund Financing Agreement, pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 7501 nt.; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

184. A letter from the Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency, transmitting the Department of the Navy's proposed lease of defense articles to Australia (Transmittal No. 3-91), pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 2796a(a); to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

185. A letter from the Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency, transmitting an addendum to the listing of all outstanding Letters of Offer to sell any major defense equipment for \$1 million or more as of September 30, 1990; an addendum to the listing of all Letters of Offer that were accepted, as of September 30, 1990, pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 2776(a); to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

186. A letter from the Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency, transmitting notification of the Department of the Navy's pro-

posed Letter(s) of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) to the Coordination Council for North American Affairs for defense articles and services (Transmittal No. 91-12), pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 2776(b); to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

187. A letter from the Acting Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, Department of State, transmitting the Secretary of State's certification of Chilean progress in human rights, that the provision of aid to Chile is in the United States national interests, and that Chile is not promoting international terrorism and is cooperating in the prosecution of the accused murderers of Orlando Letelier and Ronnie Moffitt, pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 2370 nt.; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

188. A communication from the President of the United States, transmitting notification that the Libyan emergency is to continue in effect beyond January 7, 1991, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 1622(d) (H. Doc. No. 102-20); to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and ordered to be printed.

189. A letter from the Deputy Assistant Secretary (Personnel Support, Families, Education & Safety), Department of Defense, transmitting a report on the audit of the American Red Cross for the year ending June 30, 1990, pursuant to 36 U.S.C. 6; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

190. A letter from the Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs, Department of State, transmitting copies of international agreements, other than treaties, entered into by the United States, pursuant to 1 U.S.C. 112b(a); to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

191. A letter from the Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, Department of the Treasury, transmitting a copy of the Kuwaiti assets control regulations, pursuant to Pub. L. 101-513, sec. 586(c)(1) (104 Stat. 2048); to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

192. A letter from the Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, Department of State, transmitting notification of a request from the Government of Egypt that the United States permit the use of foreign military financing for the sale and limited coproduction of 120 mm tank ammunition, pursuant to section 42(b) of the Arms Export Control Act; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

193. A letter from the Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, Department of State, transmitting the President's decision that the U.S. Government will approve the licensing of oil imports from Iran on a case-by-case basis; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

194. A letter from the Director, Office of Management and Budget, transmitting his certification that the amounts appropriated for the Board for International Broadcasting for grants to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Inc., are less than the amount necessary to maintain the budgeted level of operation because of exchange rate losses in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 1990, pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 2877(a)(2); to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

195. A communication from the President of the United States, transmitting his determination and memorandum of justification concerning Egypt's remaining foreign military sales debt, pursuant to Public Law 101-153, section 592 (H. Doc. 102-21), to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and ordered to be printed.

196. A letter from the Fiscal Assistant Secretary, Department of the Treasury, transmitting the U.S. Government Annual Report for the fiscal year ended September 30, 1990,

pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 331(b)(1)(a); to the Committee on Government Operations.

197. A letter from the Comptroller General, General Accounting Office, transmitting the results of the audit of the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. Government Printing Office for the fiscal year ended September 30, 1989, pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 309(d); jointly to the Committees on House Administration, and Government Operations.

198. A letter from the Comptroller General, General Accounting Office, transmitting a list of all reports issued by GAO in November 1990, pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 719(h); to the Committee on Government Operations.

199. A letter from the Administrator, General Services Administration, transmitting a report covering the disposal of surplus Federal real property for historic monument, correctional facility, and airport purposes for fiscal year 1990; description of negotiated disposals of surplus real property having an estimated value of more than \$15,000, pursuant to 40 U.S.C. 484(o); to the Committee on Government Operations.

200. A letter from the Director, Office of Management and Budget, transmitting a report identifying a list of accounts containing unvouchered expenditures that are potentially subject to audit by the General Accounting Office, pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3524(b); to the Committee on Government Operations.

201. A letter from the Director, Civic Achievement Award Program, transmitting the final report on the Civic Achievement Award Program covering the period from July 1, 1990 to September 30, 1990, pursuant to Public Law 100-158, section 3(b) (100 Stat. 897); to the Committee on House Administration.

202. A letter from the Clerk of the House, transmitting a list of reports pursuant to clause 2, rule III of the Rules of the House of Representatives, pursuant to rule III, clause 2, of the rules of the House (H. Doc. No. 102-23); to the Committee on House Administration and ordered to be printed.

203. A letter from the Assistant Attorney General for Legislative Affairs, Department of Justice, transmitting the 1989 annual report on the activities and operations of the Department's Public Integrity Section, Criminal Division, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 529; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

204. A letter from the Attorney General, Department of Justice, transmitting a report on the awarding of the Young American Medals for Bravery and Service for the calendar year 1989, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1925; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

205. A letter from the Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration, transmitting a status report on plans for enforcement actions related to drug activity and the provision of assistance to law enforcement agencies for the period from May 19, 1989, through May 18, 1990, pursuant to Public Law 100-690, section 7210 (102 Stat. 4432); to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation.

206. A letter from the Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration, transmitting a report on progress in correcting certain deficiencies in the Airmen and Aircraft Registry System, pursuant to Public Law 100-690, section 7207; to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation.

207. A letter from the Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, transmitting a summary and principal recommendations of the Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. space program; to the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology.

208. Communication from the President of the United States, transmitting notification of his intention to designate Nicaragua as a "beneficiary country" for purposes of granting duty-free treatment, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 2702(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Ways and Means.

209. A communication from the President of the United States, transmitting notification of his determination that a waiver with respect to the emigration practices of the Soviet Union will substantially promote the objectives of section 402 of the Trade Act of 1974, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 2432(c), (d) (H. Doc. No. 102-19); to the Committee on Ways and Means and ordered to be printed.

210. A letter from the Chairman, U.S. International Trade Commission, transmitting the Commission's 63d quarterly report on trade between the United States and the nonmarket economy countries, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 2441(c); to the Committee on Ways and Means.

211. A letter from the Acting Secretary of Labor, transmitting the sixth report on trade and employment effects of the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 2705; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

212. A letter from the Deputy Under Secretary for International Affairs and Commodity Programs, Department of Agriculture, transmitting the first quarterly country and commodity allocation table showing current programming plans for food assistance for fiscal year 1991, pursuant to 7 U.S.C. 1736b(a); jointly to the Committees on Agriculture and Foreign Affairs.

213. A letter from the Secretary of Agriculture and Administrator of Agency for International Development, transmitting their sixth quarterly report on progress made in implementing the recommendations of the Agricultural Trade and Development Missions, pursuant to 7 U.S.C. 1736b-4; jointly to the Committees on Agriculture and Foreign Affairs.

214. A letter from the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, transmitting a report on the real value of Egyptian debt owed to the United States Government, pursuant to Public Law 101-513, section 592(c)(1); jointly to the Committees on Appropriations and Foreign Affairs.

215. A letter from the Director, Office Management and Budget, transmitting a report on financing defense exports, pursuant to Public Law 101-189, section 825(b) (103 Stat. 1507); jointly to the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Affairs.

216. A letter from the Secretary of Energy, transmitting a report on the review of DOE's technology transfer contract clause; jointly to the Committees on Armed Services and Science, Space, and Technology.

217. A letter from the Assistant Secretary for Conservation and Renewable Energy, Department of Energy, transmitting his notice that a report on progress toward developing a national program of renewable energy and energy efficiency technologies should be transmitted in January 1991, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 12006; jointly to the Committees on Energy and Commerce and Science, Space, and Technology.

218. A letter from the Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, transmitting in accordance with the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, the Governor's certification for the State of Vermont; certifications from 30 State Governors and the District of Columbia; and two additional certifications and information on Vermont's status regarding the 1990 milestone,

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2021(e)(1)(E); jointly to the Committees on Energy and Commerce and Interior and Insular Affairs.

219. A letter from the Secretary of Health and Human Services transmitting a report of the Indian Health Service study of potential health hazards associated with nuclear resource development on Indian lands, pursuant to Public Law 100-713, section 717(b) (102 Stat. 4837); jointly to the Committees on Energy and Commerce and Interior and Insular Affairs.

220. A communication from the President of the United States, transmitting his report on the apportionment population for each State as of April 1, 1990, and the number of Representatives to which each State would be entitled, pursuant to 2 U.S.C. 2a(a); 13 U.S.C. 141(b) (H. Doc. No. 102-18); jointly to the Committees on the Judiciary and Post Office and Civil Service, and ordered to be printed.

221. A letter from the Secretary of Health and Human Services, transmitting a report on out-of-pocket costs of Medicare beneficiaries for physician services; jointly to the Committees on Ways and Means and Energy and Commerce.

PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 5 of rule X and clause 4 of rule XXII, public bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

[Introduced January 3, 1991]

By Mr. BRYANT:

H.R. 452. A bill to require that any telecommunications equipment or customer premises equipment manufactured by any of the former Bell operating companies may not be provided or sold in commerce in the United States unless such equipment is manufactured in the United States, and for other purposes; jointly, to the Committees on Energy and Commerce and the Judiciary.

[Introduced January 7, 1991]

By Mr. COOPER:

H.R. 459. A bill to amend title XIX of the Social Security Act to change the Federal medical assistance percentage used under the Medicaid Program; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

By Mr. KANJORSKI:

H.R. 460. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to reinstate the windfall profit tax on domestic crude oil and to appropriate the proceeds of the tax to the Resolution Trust Corporation; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

H.R. 461. A bill to provide for greater accountability for Federal Government foreign travel; jointly, to the Committees on Government Operations, the Judiciary, and House Administration.

By Mr. RANGEL:

H.R. 462. A bill to establish a national commission to develop recommendations for the establishment of model programs of treatment for drug abuse, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

H.R. 463. A bill to amend title XIX of the Social Security Act to permit States to elect the option of covering substance abuse treatment services under the Medicaid program; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

H.R. 464. A bill to establish a National Commission to Study the Causes of the Demand for Drugs in the United States; to the Committee on Government Operations.

H.R. 465. A bill to amend title 18, United States Code, to prohibit certain exports of

fully automatic or semiautomatic assault weapons; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H.R. 466. A bill to authorize appropriations for law enforcement task forces consisting of appropriate Federal, State, and local personnel; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. YOUNG of Florida:

H.R. 467. A bill to amend title 10, United States Code, to provide for payment under CHAMPUS of certain health care expenses incurred by members and former members of the Uniformed Services (and their dependents) who are entitled to retired or retainer pay and who are otherwise ineligible for such payment by reason of their entitlement to benefits under title XVIII of the Social Security Act because of a disability; to the Committee on Armed Services.

By Mr. APPELGADE:

H.J. Res. 57. Joint resolution to designate December 7, 1991, as "National Pearl Harbor Remembrance Day" on the occasion of the anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. BILIRAKIS (for himself, Mr. NEAL of North Carolina, Mrs. KENNEDY, Mr. CONYERS, and Mr. MCCOLLUM):

H.J. Res. 58. Joint resolution designating March 25, 1991, as "Greek Independence Day: A National Day of Celebration of Greek and American Democracy"; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota (for himself, Mr. MILLER of California, Mr. DURBIN, Mr. DELLUMS, and Mr. FOGLETTA):

H. Con. Res. 19. Concurrent resolution to urge the President to seek the formation of a United Nations military command and force for the Persian Gulf; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. GALLEGLY:

H. Con. Res. 20. Concurrent resolution expressing the sense of the Congress regarding the awarding of concessions at units of the National Park System; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. RANGEL:

H. Con. Res. 21. Concurrent resolution to express the sense of the Congress urging the President to recognize and include the Director of National Drug Control Policy as a fully participating member of the President's Cabinet; to the Committee on Government Operations.

By Mr. KANJORSKI:

H. Res. 25. Resolution to create a Select Committee to Investigate Financial Institution Fraud, Mismanagement, Oversight, and Supervision; to the Committee on Rules.

PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 1 of rule XXII, private bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

[Introduced January 3, 1991]

By Mr. COLEMAN of Texas:

H.R. 453. A bill for the relief of Marcelino Serna; to the Committee on Armed Services.

H.R. 454. A bill for the relief of Bruce C. Veit; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. FISH:

H.R. 455. A bill for the relief of Melissa Johnson; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. GOSS:

H.R. 456. A bill for the relief of William L. Stuck, Glenn Jenkins, Charles L. Cavell, and Nathan J. Schnurman; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HORTON:

H.R. 457. A bill for the relief of Chi Chia Long; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. LEHMAN of Florida:

H.R. 458. A bill for the relief of Pilar Mejia Weiss; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

ADDITIONAL SPONSORS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII, sponsors were added to public bills and resolutions as follows:

H.R. 3: Mrs. LOWEY of New York, Mr. SEN-
SENBRENNER, Mr. LEHMAN of California, Mr.
HOUGHTON, Mr. MC MILLAN of North Carolina,
Mr. BEVILL, Mr. DUNCAN, Mr. GUNDERSON,
Mr. FAZIO, Mr. MCCANDLESS, and Ms. LONG.
H.R. 320: Mr. MANTON, Mr. APPELEGATE, and
Mr. WEISS.

H. Con. Res. 1: Mr. ANNUNZIO, Mr. MILLER
of California, Mr. ROYBAL, Mr. STARK, Mr.
SCHUMER, Mr. TOWNS, Mrs. BOXER, Mr. MRAZ-
EK, Mr. SANGMEISTER, Mr. EVANS, Mr. BOU-
CHER, Mr. HOCHBRUECKNER, Mr. MCHUGH, Ms.
SLAUGHTER of New York, Mrs. UNSOELD, Mr.
TRAXLER, Mr. DELLUMS, Mr. SANDERS, Mr.

COSTELLO, Mr. MAZZOLI, Mr. RANGEL, Mr.
YATES, Mr. KLECZKA, Mr. NAGLE, Mr. SABO,
Mr. GEJDENSON, Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. UDALL, Mr.
ATKINS, Mr. WAXMAN, Mr. PANETTA, Mr.
MFUME, Mr. KOSTMAYER, Mr. POSHARD, Mr.
LEWIS of Georgia, Mr. PEASE, Mr. WYDEN,
Mr. MATSUI, Mr. MARKEY, Mrs. COLLINS of Il-
linois, Mr. TORRES, Mr. GLICKMAN, Mr. KIL-
DEE, Mr. MCCLOSKEY, Mr. ROE, Mr. VENTO,
Mr. DEFazio, Ms. PELOSI, Mr. FAZIO, Mr.
JONTZ, Mr. OLIN, Mr. DORGAN of North Da-
kota, Mr. BROWN of California, Mr.
McDERMOTT, Mr. NEAL of North Carolina,
Mr. MOODY, Mr. WOLPE, and Mr. COYNE.